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2Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to compare various climate policies within a cost-benefit
analysis framework in a world divided in five regional groups.  Global cooperation is
compared with non cooperative behavior and partial cooperation (coalition of
countries cooperating while others do not) in terms of economic and environmental
impacts.  The next step is to deviate from an economic analysis of cooperative and non
cooperative policies to study the impacts of various hypothetical climate policies as
well as policies discussed from the Earth Summit to the Kyoto Protocol: uniform
reduction, different stabilization policies and policies associated with the Kyoto
Protocol.  This more pragmatic issue, which is less aimed at efficiency, demonstrates
that an “ideal” scenario does not exist, because economic and environmental objectives
do not necessarily coincide.  It also shows that the Kyoto Protocol was probably more
directed towards an environmental rather than an economic goal and examines an
alternative option for retaining the participation of the United Sates.
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31.  Introduction
By burning fossil fuels and increasing the rate of deforestation, man is interfering with
the natural greenhouse effect.  Greenhouse gas concentration is steadily rising and
climate models estimate that before the end of next century, concentration would have
doubled compared to pre-industrial levels and the earth might be 1.5 to 4.5 degrees
warmer (with a 2.5 degrees value used in this study) at the equilibrium.  The
consequences of such a predicted warming include sea level rise; changes in agricultural
practices and in vegetation, an increase in the frequency of tropical storms and
hurricanes and an impact on human health.  Public awareness has steadily increased
over the past decade with the writing of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change signed in Rio in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol signed in Japan in 1997.
     A standard framework of analysis for environmental economists is the theory of
externalities which is based on welfare economics.  Since the emission of greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere causes a public bad (negative public good) externality,
therefore generating a market failure, the "laissez-faire" solution is unable to generate
the optimal amount of pollution.  The externality can only be internalized through
cooperation between the actors as no country can impose a policy to another
independent nation.
     After a brief explanation of the cost-benefit formulation (section 2), the economic
and environmental impacts of worldwide cooperation versus a non cooperative
behavior will be compared in section 3.  Since the early discussions about emissions
reduction at the Earth summit in 1992, some countries showed a willingness to curtail
4emissions while others did not; partial cooperative scenarios, and their impacts on
regional and global abatement as well as welfare, are thus examined in section 4.
Section 5 departs from the economic analysis of relations between rational cooperative
and non cooperative regions to evaluate the impacts of various political scenarios,
among which the Kyoto Protocol with and without the participation of the United
States.  General conclusions are then derived in the final section.
2.  Cost-Benefit Analysis
Any model is based on hypotheses, any computation is based on existing data and any
hypothesis or data used can and does influence the final results.  This is also the case
in this study and as a precautionary measure in interpreting the final results, the five
main hypotheses used in the cost-benefit formulation and their impacts on the results
are stressed below.
     The first hypothesis is the division of the world into five groups: the United Sates
of America (USA), the other OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development - countries (OOECD), the former Soviet Union (FSU), China and the
rest of the world (ROW).  This can be considered too limited or arbitrary, but it is
mostly due to the availability of data even though some recent models have a few
additional players  (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996).  Another issue is that the ROW group
is very heterogeneous because it includes nations ranging from oil exporting countries
and poor African nations to small Pacific islands, all of which have obviously very
different views about global warming.  It certainly prevents the generalization of a
5conclusion for the ROW group to all its members.  Nonetheless, each group is an
important polluter and the main purpose is to understand the interactions between
these large players in terms of cooperation possibilities, environmental effort and net
benefit.
     The analysis spans over 110 years (from 1990 to 2100) to underscore the fact that
climate change is a long term problem.  However, the cost-benefit formulations are not
time dependent.  As a matter of fact, regional business-as-usual emissions (EBj,t) in
billion tons of carbon estimated until 2100 by Manne (1993) are used to compute
yearly emissions of a restrictive policy (Ej,t) and the abatement that automatically
follows (Θj,t= E
B
j,t- Ej,t); these data are then summed up over all t periods to get global
and regional emissions1 and abatement of a particular environmental policy.   Similarly,
regional abatement costs and benefits of emissions reduction are computed over time
and are then discounted and summed to get a global figure expressed in terms of global
and regional abatement.  If a fully dynamic issue might give different results, a static
formulation is nevertheless acceptable as the Kyoto Protocol stresses target emissions
to be reached at some period of time instead of emission trajectories requiring a
dynamic analysis (Chander et al., 1999).
     Costs are defined as losses from a country’s own output2 – Cj=f(Θj) –, benefits are
computed as damages prevented from a global climate policy – Bj=f(Θ) and they are
also assumed to be additive: (B=∑jBj and C=∑jCj).  Various cost data have been
computed by other authors (Manne and Richels, 1992; OECD, 1993; Nordhaus, 1994)
and benefits are derived from, among others, damage at CO2 doubling, previously
computed as well (Fankhauser and Pearce, 1994).  As in all modeling exercises, results
6of the cost-benefit analysis can only be credible if the estimated data are credible.  This
suggests some caution in the interpretation of the results.  The static cost-benefit
formulation derived from dynamic data follows Hamaide and Boland (2000) and is
stated formally in the appendix.
     It is also assumed that a doubling of CO2 concentration with respect to pre-
industrial levels will bring about a rise in temperature of 2.5 degrees Celsius (ν=2.5) at
equilibrium. This is a rather standard hypothesis (Cline, 1992) and a change of half a
degree would only slightly advance or delay the regional benefits without having a
significant impact on the aggregate static cost-benefit analysis.
     The discount rate is set at a uniform 2 percent by hypothesis.  Any change in the
discount rate would obviously modify the results, but a rate of 2 to 3 percent is
generally what is recommended in such a study (Lind, 1990; Nordhaus, 1994).  Even if
the idea of a positive discount rate can be criticized on grounds of intergenerational
equity, that argument should be dealt with out of the rigid procedures of discounting.
Indeed, accepting the idea of monetizing costs and benefits implicitly includes the idea
of time preference, which, added to the fact that Gross World Product (GWP) is
expected to increase over time, calls for a non zero discount rate.
     In summary, the cost-benefit formulation presented in the appendix is based on
various assumptions that can be justified and on available data knowing that other
hypotheses and data might somewhat modify the conclusions.  Nevertheless, as long
as data used are correct, this simple formulation may give an interesting insight on the
economic impact of a climate policy (magnitude of the net benefit or net cost) as well
as on the environmental impact (magnitude of the effort required).
73.  Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Behavior
Economically speaking, because no supra-national organization can force all regions to
adopt a particular policy, it will be up to each individual entity to decide either to
behave rationally without taking into account the impact of its pollution on others or
to cooperate with the other players so as to arrive at a socially desired outcome and
internalize the externality.
     The non cooperative strategy implies that, by ignoring the impact of its emission
policy on others, region j maximizes its own welfare (net benefit) while taking as given
the behavior of the other players:
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Θ
µλσα (1)
which implies an optimal emission reduction  Θj such that Cj
’(Θj)= Bj
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that Cj(Θj) = λj Θj + µj Θj
2 et Bj(Θ) = αj Θ + σj Θ
2  (see Appendix).
     Economic efficiency is reached when all countries act as if they are a single entity
thereby internalizing the externality by maximizing their global net benefit:
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with α=Σi αi and σ=Σiσi.  The first order conditions equalize regional marginal
abatement cost with social marginal abatement benefit (Cj
’(Θj)= B
’(Θ)) which gives a
8Pareto optimal abatement where it is not possible to increase someone’s net benefit
without reducing someone else’s own welfare.
     Regional optimal abatement in aggregate value between today and the year 2100
(Θj) as well as in percentage of reduction (Rj=Θj/Ej) and net payoffs (Wj=Bj-Cj) are
displayed in Table I for the cooperative and non cooperative cases.
Table I
     The optimal non cooperative abatement is very small (5.8 percent of global
emissions).  Even though every player derives a positive net payoff, the developed
world is the major winner since the USA is free riding and 95 percent of the effort is
undertaken by non OECD countries.  Rational individualistic behavior may thus be
optimal in an economic sense, but it is certainly not equitable to developing nations.
     The cooperative formulation obviously induces a higher abatement (16.6 percent)
and a higher social welfare but is again placing the burden on developing countries3
For full cooperation to be feasible, every player must be at least as well off as in non
cooperation.  Therefore, China and the USA need to be compensated which is
theoretically possible since the extra amount earned by all the other players is higher
than the amount China and the USA lose from cooperating. Nevertheless,
compensating the USA and restricting developing nations while being more lenient
with rich countries makes full cooperation a politically unacceptable scenario in
reality.
9     As full cooperation is unfair and as decided in the Kyoto Protocol, it is clear that
some form of imperfect cooperation is taking place. Technically, this issue can be
handled in two different ways.  On one hand, economic theory enables to study the
outcome of coalitions playing against rational individualistic nations.  On the other
hand, pragmatic policy analysis can use hypothetical (or current) partially cooperative
policies as a starting point, no matter its economic efficiency or inefficiency, to derive
net payoffs and the resulting abatement.  Both methods are considered, the former
being discussed in the next section and the latter in the subsequent sections.
3.  Partial Cooperation: Coalitions
In a partially cooperative framework, each non cooperative entity m maximizes its
own net benefit (equation 3) whereas cooperative nations y maximize their coalition’s
welfare (equation 4).
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and M+Y=N.
     The first order conditions of equations 3 and 4 can be computed and give a unique
solution as there are respectively M and Y equations with M  and Y unknowns.  After
simplifying and rearranging the terms, the optimal abatements for the M non
cooperative countries are
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and the optimal emissions reduction for countries in the coalition are
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     Various coalitions will be compared based on the following hypotheses.  First,
because of the European behavior since the early stages of the negotiation process, it is
assumed that they are always part of the cooperative coalition and that their view is
taken up by all members of the OOECD region (which is not obvious in reality as the
umbrella group represented by Canada, Australia and Japan may be more inclined to
follow the USA rather than Europe).  Second, for equity reasons, it is assumed that the
ROW and China will not agree to restrain their emissions unless the developed world
(USA and OOECD) as well as FSU do the same.  Excluding the full cooperative
solution explained earlier, five coalitions respect the above hypotheses.  They are
i)USA+OOECD+FSU+ROW, ii) USA+OOECD+FSU+China, iii)
USA+OOECD+FSU – that is approximately the Annex I countries of the Kyoto
Protocol - , iv) USA+OOECD and v) OOECD+FSU.  Each of these coalitions should
be taken as examples and the purpose of the exercise is to see the impact of a
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particular coalition on global abatement and social as well as regional welfare.
Therefore, coalition stability is not tested.
     Table II displays disaggregated net payoffs (Wj) and percentage of abatement (Rj)
for all five scenarios as well as the resulting social welfare:
Table II
     In the first scenario, all industrialized countries, as well as developing nations,
having an incentive to cooperate in terms of payoff form a cooperative coalition
whereas China is free riding.  As ROW is the only cooperating region with a low
abatement cost, it has to abate the most for compensating the non participation of
China, the other low abatement cost country.  Only one player in the coalition, the
USA, is worse off but social welfare being much larger than at full non cooperation, it
can theoretically be compensated by the other players, including developing countries.
Common sense therefore requires to qualify this scenario, requiring transfer from the
South to the North to hold, as inapplicable – politically unacceptable - in reality.
      If China agrees to form a coalition with Annex I countries while the ROW abates
up to the point where its own marginal benefit is equal to its own marginal cost, global
abatement and social welfare are the highest of all current scenarios, which is
intuitively expected since China has low abatement cost and ROW makes the largest
effort of all players at non cooperation while deriving net benefit.  China and the USA
are obviously worse off than at non cooperation as they both were free riding.  Side
payments are again theoretically possible but would require a transfer from the South
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to the North ruled out in the previous scenario for equity reason and by common
sense.
     The third scenario is a coalition made of the USA, the other OECD countries and
the Former Soviet Union.  It brings about emissions reduction and a global welfare that
are both about half way between the cooperative and the non cooperative solutions.
For the coalition to be sustained, OECD countries must be compensated which would
again require a South – North transfer and cannot stand in practice.  But this scenario
is in the line of thought of the Kyoto Protocol with the difference that Annex I
countries are asked to cooperate as if they are a single entity instead of reaching a
target abatement within a certain time frame while the other nations are asked to be
individually rational (that is equating their own marginal benefit and cost) instead of
being able to free ride.  If Annex I countries agree not to be compensated (which again
is in the line of thought of the Kyoto Protocol), this behavior is now turned around
and may be considered as a unilateral transfer from the North to the South aimed at
reducing environmental externalities in the South4 as advocated by Yang (1999) while
poor countries would follow their Nash strategy instead of a no-control policy5.
     The last two scenarios are worse in all perspectives: lower abatement, lower social
welfare, more South – North transfers; and they are thus not credible from a political
perspective.  For illustration purpose, the “Kyoto without the USA” scenario in a
cooperative versus non cooperative framework would lower global abatement by more
than 20 percent compared to the USA participation (10.9 versus 8.4 percent
abatement) and lead them to free ride.
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     In conclusion, with the hypotheses posed at the beginning of this section, even
though all scenarios are economically viable with transfer payments, none is politically
acceptable as the burden is disproportionately placed on developing nations in terms
of abatement and transfer payments.  And, when analyzing the “Kyoto coalition”, it is
only when the economic efficiency objective of the scenario, reducing global emissions
by 10.9 percent, is set aside or in other words, if transfer payments are canceled and
the OECD countries accept to bear the costs of cooperation, that it may perhaps
become politically viable or politically open for discussion as it implies that China
would free ride but that the other developing countries would abate the amount
equating their own marginal benefits and costs.
4.  Uniform Reduction
The purpose of this section and the following ones is less the economic analysis than
the pragmatic analysis.  Knowing that a global or partial optimum is rarely reached,
the idea is to evaluate and compare the economic impact and the resulting abatement of
various policies that have been discussed over the years since the Earth Summit or that
are purely hypothetical. The policy options examined are a uniform abatement
strategy and other strategies in the Kyoto Protocol and the Framework Convention of
Climate Change line of thought with and without constraints on non OECD countries.
     Command-and-Control policies are the most widely used tools in environmental
policies and one of the most common option is the uniform reduction; this is why it is
considered here.  The best uniform target is obviously a policy bringing about the
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optimal cooperative abatement, that is 16.6 percent reduction.  This is indeed
confirmed by finding a value of Θ for which B'(Θ)=C'(Θ).  The curve C(Θ) is found
by fitting a line through ∑jCj(Θj) which is depicted in Figure 1
6.   Resulting regional net
benefits are displayed in Table III.
Table III
Figure 1
     By imposing a uniform abatement and not a reduction based on regional cost
curves, the burden is now shared evenly instead on being mostly placed on developing
nations.  Resulting welfare is therefore distributed differently and to the advantage of
poor nations (China is even better off than in free riding because of its negative
abatement cost shape during the first percentages of abatement).  The loss of USA
which is not free riding as in non cooperation can easily be compensated by transfer
payments from the OOECD alone for the scenario to hold theoretically.
     In summary, social welfare is slightly smaller than at full cooperation (6136<6305)
but still very high and appropriated at more than 80 percent by poor nations; the three
non OECD groups are better off than at non cooperation, that is better off than if each
individual entity behaves rationally and the burden is shared evenly (but the feasibility
of a reduction for poor countries is yet to be analyzed and accepted politically).  And
since a uniform percentage reduction is the easiest method to implement, it could have
been a good alternative to the targets set out in Kyoto.
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5.  Other Policy Scenarios
 Uniform abatement has not received a large approval during the negotiations as it has
been estimated that the first and largest step should be done by  developed countries.
For that reason, it is interesting to compare the impact of stabilizing emissions (and
not concentration) in OECD countries with and without restraints on non OECD
nations as originally proposed in the Framework Convention of Climate Change in
1992 and decreasing emissions in the same countries compared to 1990 levels as
proposed in the Kyoto Protocol.
5.1. THE STABILIZATION SCENARIOS7
The three scenarios are as such: i) stabilization of OECD emissions  at their 1990
levels while non OECD emissions go “business-as-usual”, b)  stabilization of OECD
emissions  at their 1990 levels with a ceiling of twice 1990 emissions on non-OECD
countries and c) stabilization of OECD emissions  at their 1990 levels with a uniform
reduction of 16.6 percent in the developing world as of 2010.  Regional net payoffs
and abatement efforts are displayed in Table IV.
Table IV
     Stabilizing emissions in OECD countries imposes a very large net cost to the rich
world whereas non-OECD countries derive benefits from the abatement in the
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developed nations.  If China and ROW would obviously agree on such a policy, FSU
would nevertheless have had an incentive to abate up to its non cooperative point and
not to completely free ride as the cost of its first emissions restrictions is negative –
but that is not taken into account here as the hypothesis is that non OECD countries
go business-as-usual.  On the whole, social welfare, is largely negative (W=-5028) for a
global abatement of 17.1 percent, which is larger than at full cooperation.  However,
the environmental advantage of that policy needs to be traded off against the global
economic loss it brings about.
     The second policy option restricts emissions of non-OECD countries below twice
their 1990 levels until 2100. The former Soviet Union does not undertake any
abatement because in business-as-usual conditions, they less than double their
emissions over the 110 year period.  China and ROW are however very much
restricted in their CO2 release because of their rapidly increasing emission trend in
business-as-usual conditions (65 and 53 percent reduction respectively).  Therefore,
they incur very large costs and have negative net payoffs.  The larger FSU payoff with
respect to non cooperative equilibrium and the improvement of USA and OOECD
with respect to the previous policy is far from being sufficient to compensate the loss
of China and ROW; hence, social welfare is even more negative than in the previous
scenario where OECD acts by itself.  On the environmental side, this is a seemingly
favorable option since there is a global emissions cut of 49.4 percent but it would be
done at the expense of developing countries which is thus inapplicable in policy
negotiations.
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     It has been shown above (section 4) that a uniform emissions reduction of 16.6
percent is an interesting candidate from an environmental and economic standpoint
while sharing the burden of CO2 curtailment evenly.  If the OECD nations still
stabilize their emissions at 1990 levels by 2010 and the three other players agree to
reduce 16.6 percent of their emissions from 2010, while staying at that level thereafter,
social welfare becomes slightly positive (W=35) and abatement reaches 27.6 percent.
This scenario, while being economically inefficient, has various advantages.  First,
OECD's net payoffs are less negative than if they act alone.  Second, the burden of
abatement is placed on rich nations who need to reduce about half of their emissions.
And third, non-OECD's payoffs are all positive, contrary to the previous option and
even higher than at cooperative and non cooperative equilibriums.
5.2. THE KYOTO SCENARIOS
Instead of stabilizing emissions in developed nations, the Kyoto Protocol went
further and asked for emission reductions in the OECD and stabilization in the FSU.
Three additional scenarios are considered.  The fourth one is the original Kyoto
Protocol, the fifth one is the Protocol with a free riding behavior from the USA and
the last one is the Protocol with a uniform reduction of 16.6 percent in the developing
world as of 2010.  Emission reductions and net benefits of these three scenarios are
illustrated in Table V.
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Table V
      The original Kyoto Protocol negotiated in 1997 is aimed at reducing emissions by
5.2 percent in 2008-2012 in Annex I countries while the others go business-as-usual.
The FSU needs to curtail its emissions back to their 1990 levels by 2010 (as an
average of the period 2008-2012), and it is assumed that they remain constant
thereafter.  Emissions in the USA and OOECD have to decrease by 7 and 7.3 percent
respectively compared to 1990 levels and remain constant thereafter.  The choice of
the OOECD target (7.3 percent) is calibrated in such a way that this number brings
about a 5.2 percent reduction in Annex I countries by 2010 as mentioned in the
Protocol.  Compared to the stabilization scenarios, OECD countries make a larger
reduction and their net loss is thus worsening.  FSU is losing as well in stabilizing its
emissions because of the shape of its cost curve (negative in the early phases of
abatement and then very steep: OECD, 1993).  Non OECD countries, being
unrestricted, get large positive net payoffs but it is not sufficient to cover the loss of
the other regions and therefore, social welfare is largely negative.  Economically
speaking, computations show that the Kyoto Protocol is not an acceptable solution.
Nonetheless, the environmental impact of the Kyoto Protocol is fairly large as it
brings about a 20.8 percent reduction in global emissions: it is more than at full
cooperation (16.6 percent) and about twice as much than the FSU-OECD coalition
(10.9 percent).  The justification of the negotiated Protocol may therefore have been a
tradeoff of economic efficiency for environmental purposes.
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     In 2001, the Bush administration refused to ratify the Protocol.  If this can make
economic sense, looking at the rough numbers exposed above, it did change the global
picture and the global idea behind the Protocol.  First, the Protocol was denied its
apparent prime importance for environmental objectives rather than economic
efficiency.  Then, the free riding position of the USA might have induced the other
OECD nations to follow that lead as they would again bear an even larger burden
(their net loss increases from 6510 to 7425) than expected and it might also have
induced the FSU to be reluctant about stabilizing its emissions while the richest
country in the world would not.  Because of the worldwide outrage following its
decision and for the remaining Protocol not to break apart, the USA is proposing an
alternative solution for itself but some large OECD countries (the umbrella group:
Canada, Australia and Japan) are still hesitating about their final position on the
ratification.  Provided that the USA is free riding – which is their non cooperative
economic result - but that the umbrella group is ratifying the Protocol, and that the
FSU nevertheless accepts to stabilize its emissions, global curtailment is now down to
12.5 percent, that is about 40 percent less than the original expected environmental
impact.
     One of the most common request from US negotiators concerns the participation of
developing countries (Shogren, 2000) as they may be the largest emitters of greenhouse
gases later in the century.  An alternative solution may therefore be to have the USA
sticking with the previous administration’s target of the Kyoto Protocol while
attracting developing countries to agree to a uniform reduction compared to business-
as-usual levels without compromising both their welfare and their future development.
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The proposal is a mix of the Kyoto Protocol for the OECD only and the 16.6 percent
uniform reduction as of 2010 - so that targets become enforceable for the whole world
at the same time - for the others.    In this hypothetical scenario, the largest burden is
obviously borne by OECD nations, FSU would derive positive net payoffs contrary
to its Kyoto objective and because of the expected shape of their cost curves,
developing countries should not theoretically be harmed by these restrictions as their
payoffs would be larger than at non cooperation.  Social loss is greatly reduced
compared to the original Protocol (1142<6495) and it is the most aggressive
environmental policy as global emissions are substantially reduced by an overall 28.7
percent.
6.  Conclusion
Negotiations over the past ten years demonstrate that worldwide cooperation for
reducing emissions is currently unrealistic, but that some nations agree to cooperate for
combating global warming.  Various possible coalitions have been examined and their
economic behavior shows that not a single scenario does respect a fairness standpoint
between the developed and the developing worlds, as the latter has to abate much more
than the former and is even supposed to give away part of its extra benefit to rich
nations.
     Other policies are then examined knowing that they may not be economically
efficient.  The simplest (and most often implemented) case is a uniform reduction.  A
16.6 percent emissions restraint in each region seems an interesting policy candidate as
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the effort is non trivial and the largely positive payoffs are distributed favorably to
developing countries which can be an incentive for their approval.  The stabilization
scenarios are rather aggressive from an environmental standpoint, but bring about a
large welfare loss, and are therefore economically inefficient (only when non OECD
nations are constrained by a uniform reduction is global welfare becoming positive).
     If the United States were to participate in the Kyoto Protocol, the very large
environmental impact (20.8 percent reduction) would be reached at the expense of a
big welfare loss for the parties involved in the Protocol and with a welfare gain for free
riding developing countries.  In this regard, the US reaction of dropping its
participation from the Protocol is not too surprising, and the reaction of Europe to
nevertheless implement it can be considered as a good example of environmental
conscientiousness.  It remains to be seen which party the FSU and the umbrella group
will follow; but all other things being equal, the Protocol without the United States has
a much more limited environmental impact for a still bad economic efficiency.
     As the USA has shown that it will not untie environmental and economic
objectives, contrary to Europe, without an important exogenous stimulus, some
developing countries participation may be needed for achieving the largest
environmental reduction from the largest possible group.  In that sense, the emission
targets of the Kyoto Protocol for OECD countries coupled with a uniform reduction
elsewhere large enough to have an environmental impact and small enough for not
hindering development may be a credible alternative.  Without being efficient, this
scenario may  hold both from its effectiveness -large reduction in emissions - and its
22
burden sharing rule -most burden on OECD countries but participation of non OECD
countries.
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Appendix : Equations of the cost-benefit model
Benefit computations
- Step 1 : estimate CO2 concentration in time (Γ(t)) based on regional emission data
(Ej(t)) :
Γ (t+1) = AΓ(t) + (ηεE(t)) (A1)
where A is the extinction parameter associated with CO2 ocean absorption, η is the
airborne fraction of CO2, ε converts billion tons of carbon equivalent in ppmv – parts
per million in volume - and  E(t)=_jEj(t).  A, η and ε are known parameters.
-  Step 2 : estimate equilibrium warming :
∆T(t) = α ln Γ(t) - β (A2)
where α and β are calibrated so that ∆T(t)=0 at pre-industrial levels, and by
hypothesis, ∆T(t) = ν = 2.5  at CO2 doubling
-  Step 3 : compute regional damages in time (Dj(t)) :
( ) ( ) ( )
γ
υ 


∆Ω=
tT
tQtD jjj (A3)
where Qj(t) is the regional GDP, _j, the scale of regional damages at CO2 doubling
(Fankhauser et Pearce, 1994) and γ a non linear parameter.
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-  Step 4 : compute benefits as damages prevented when restricting greenhouse gas
emissions Θ :
Bj
Θ (t) = Dj
B (t) - Dj
Θ (t) (A4)
where B stands for “business-as-usual”.
-  Step 5 : regional benefits from 1990 to 2100 are then discounted back to 1990 and
summed over the whole period to get a number corresponding to a particular emissions
reduction policy.  The same computations are repeated for all abatement percentages
so as to get a series of points in the benefit versus abatement space.   The best fit
function going through these points is :
( ) 2Θ+Θ=Θ jjjB σα (A5)
Cost computations
Regional abatement costs Cj(t) are estimated  based on existing data (OECD, 1993 ;
Nordhaus, 1994) for various abatement levels Θ.  As in step 5 of benefit
computations, they are then discounted back to 1990 and summed up, yielding one
point per abatement policy in the cost versus abatement space.  This is done for
various policies and a curve is fitted through the points. The best fit is obtained by
equation A6:
( )Cj j j j j jΘ Θ Θ= +λ µ 2 (A6)
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Optimal cooperative and non cooperative abatement
The first order conditions of equation 1 under non negativity constraints give the
optimal non cooperative abatement, which is , after simplifications
( ) Njji ijj
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     First order conditions of equation 2 shows optimal regional cooperative abatement,
or, after rearrangement:
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Optimal abatement computed with equations A7 and A8 are displayed in Table I.  Net
benefit, Wj is then calculated by replacing the values of Θj in equations 1 and 2.
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Figure 1: Global Benefit Cost Comparison
Non cooperative Θj Wj non coop Cooperative Θj Wj coop
USA 0% (0) 354 14.7% (44) 282
OOECD 1.5% (5) 624 14.5% (46) 1105
FSU 10.9% (18) 1139 13.3% (22) 1468
China 0% (0) 667 17.6% (64) 637
ROW 12.8% (82) 1571 18.9% (121) 2813
Total 5.8% (105) 4355 16.6% (297) 6305
Table I: Optimal Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Abatement (Θj) in Percentage of
Regional Emissions and in Billion Tons of Carbon over 1990-2100 (in Parentheses)
and Resulting Net Payoffs (Wj) in Billions of 1990 US Dollars.
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Coal 1 Coal 2 Coal 3 Coal 4 Coal 5
Wj Rj Wj Rj Wj Rj Wj Rj Wj Rj
US 85 14.7 133 14.8 -68 14.8 -82 14.9 511 0
OOECD 746 14.4 835 14.5 469 14.5 444 14.6 196 15.5
FSU 1345 13.7 1374 13.7 1257 13.8 1312 10.9 1168 13.8
China 1518 0 528 16.1 1240 0 1215 0 962 0
ROW 2073 19.9 3064 12.8 2475 12.8 2435 12.8 2035 12.8
W,R 5767 13.4 5934 14.2 5374 10.9 5324 10.7 4872 8.4
Table II: Regional Net Payoffs (Wj) - in Bi.  USD - and Emissions Reductions (Rj) - in
Percentage - for Various Coalitions.
Rj   =  R  = 0.166 Non
Coop
Wj coop
Wj Θj Wj Wj
USA 113 50 354 282
OOECD 906 53 624 1105
FSU 1244 27 1139 1468
China 735 61 667 637
ROW 3139 106 1571 2813
W,  Θ 6136 297 4355 6305
Table III: Regional Net Payoffs (Wj) - in Bi. USD - and Abatement (Θj) - in Bi. Tons
of Carbon - of Uniform Emissions Reduction
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case 1 Case 2 case 3
Wj Θj Rj Wj Θj Rj Wj Θj Rj
USA -4654 139 46.5 -2761 139 46.5 -4033 139 46.5
OOECD -5983 167 52.2 -2474 167 52.2 -4838 167 52.2
FSU 612 0 0 1762 0 0 1740 25 15.3
China 1940 0 0 -5554 236 64.5 2015 59 16.2
ROW 3057 0 0 -6668 341 53.3 5151 103 16.4
W,Θ,R -5028 306 17.1 -15695 883 49.4 35 493 27.6
Table IV: Regional Net Payoffs (Wj ) - in Bi.  USD -, Abatement (Θj) - in Bi. T. of C  -
and Emissions Reductions (Rj) - in Percentage -  for Various Stabilization Policies
case 4 case 5 case 6
Wj Θj Rj Wj Θj Rj Wj Θj Rj
USA -5231 149 49.8 753 0 0 -4764 149 49.8
OOECD -6510 177 55.3 -7425 177 55.3 -5648 177 55.3
FSU -823 46 28.2 -1121 46 28.2 1780 25 15.3
China 2353 0 0 1417 0 0 2139 59 16.2
ROW 3716 0 0 2229 0 0 5351 103 16.4
W,Θ,R -6495 372 20.8 -4147 223 12.5 -1142 513 28.7
Table V: Regional Net Payoffs (Wj ) - in Bi.  USD -, Abatement (Θj) - in Bi. T. of C  -
and Emissions Reductions (Rj) - in Percentage -  for Various Kyoto Policies
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1  The sum of business-as-usual emissions from 1990 to 2100 in billion (109) tons of
carbon equivalent are respectively 299, 321, 163, 365 and 640 for the USA, the other
OECD countries, the former Soviet Union, China and the rest of the world.
2   They do not take into account any flexibility mechanism as proposed by the Kyoto
Protocol
3  This is due to their relatively lower abatement cost curves as estimated by Manne
and Richels (1992) and OECD (1993)
4  Except in China since its non cooperative solution is to abate nothing
5  An important difference is that in Yang (1999), under certain conditions, unilateral
transfers improves both the welfare of the North and global welfare.
6 Figure 1 can be drawn as a single net benefit curve as in Boyd et al. (1995).
7 Emission restrictions in all this section’s scenarios are computed with respect to
business-as-usual levels as of 2010 like established in the Kyoto Protocol.  Therefore,
no emission in any case is restricted from 1990 and 2010.
